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EVOLUTION AND CHALLENGES 
  
 
Georgios Zacharias  
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Abstract: The diplomacy of Japan towards its Asian neighbours has always been a complex issue. Throughout the 
years, the foreign policy of Japan has witnessed severe alterations specifically after the Second World War. Since 
then, new challenges and opportunities have risen which have formed a new, adapted Japanese diplomacy, albeit 
not disconnected from its traditional aspects and its past. The current purpose of the paper is to highlight these 
evolutions and challenges of the post WWII Japanese diplomacy. The focus will be on the two main neighbours 
and traditional partners of Japan, the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of Korea. There will be an effort 
to highlight the challenges that Japan experiences with the aforementioned countries, its diplomatic approaches 
and how these could be evolved in the near future.  
 





The Japanese diplomacy and foreign policy in Asia is a rather complex issue. 
Diplomacy could be rather defined as the constant pursuit of national interests and 
achievement of these objectives via peaceful means. However, as it always has been, factors 
such as the regional and international environment, the domestic political context, values and 
ideology, are heavily determining the diplomatic approaches of each country. Japan is no 
exception to that common rule. The Japanese diplomacy‟s historical background is full of 
alterations as it is evolving for hundreds of years. Until today at a certain extent, the 
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traditional self-perception of the role of Japan in the region and subsequent challenges that 
follow it, still play a major role to the articulation of its foreign policy. Japan‟s openness to the 
world in the XIX century was a major event in terms of the diplomatic history of the country. 
Nevertheless, that does not mean that its foreign policy starts at that very moment. The 
Japanese diplomacy has deep roots into the past. Long traditional relationships with China 
and Korea for example, do exist long before the Meiji Restoration and the end of the Sakoku 
period, key historical events of the modern Japanese history associated with the analysis of 
the foreign relations of Japan. In fact, even at the isolation (Sakoku) period, the Tokugawa 
shogunate had established bilateral exchanges with China, Korea and the Dutch, proving that 
the diplomatic history of the country is much richer than it seems (Yasunori 2013). However, 
the focus of the current paper is not attached at the historical overview but instead it 
emphasizes on the current Japanese diplomacy in Asia. Short briefs and historical overviews 
will be made in order for the evolution and current challenges of Japan towards its neighbors 
to be better understood. The essay will be divided into two main chapters. The first one will 
be focusing on the Japanese diplomacy towards China, its long standing partner and rival 
with approximately two millenniums of bilateral engagement; The second one will emphasize 
in an another important player in the region, South Korea. The current paper will indicate and 
analyze the current diplomatic issues and challenges between Japan and its two significant 
counterparts, the main diplomatic approaches of the Japanese governments after the end of 
the World War II and its potential evolution at the near future. 
 
THE JAPANESE DIPLOMACY IN THE REGION 
 
First of all, before proceeding to the current case studies, some main key elements of 
the Japanese diplomatic framework in Asia must be noted. The traditional diplomacy of the 
country was always seeking recognition and understanding by its neighbors. That has driven 
its policy choices for a long time especially before World War II, when Japan considered itself 
to be responsible of leading Asia, as the main great power in the region. Its post war 
diplomatic approach varies in the way that Japan now portrays itself as the bearer of the 
international order in the region, pursuing its recognition as a provider of economic 
advancement and political stability in Asia (Kazuo 2015). That approach of course is a key 
point of friction with China due to the country‟s unprecedented economic and military rise. 
In addition, as mentioned above, many factors also determine approaches at the 
foreign policy domain. As a result, the Japanese diplomacy is rather complicated. Firstly, there 
are the domestic factors. The rise of nationalism in Japan, public opinion and party politics 
are heavily influencing the foreign policy decision making. The political leaders, for instance, 
both in government and in opposition, are heavily engaged in the diplomatic domain, 
focusing on the sensitive diplomatic issues, sometimes even more than the MFA bureaucrats 
themselves (Wan 2016). Secondly, there is the external environment. The US-Japanese 
Security Treaty and alliance are shaping the responses of Japanese diplomacy in many cases 
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regarding its bilateral relations, especially with China. When for example the Trump 
administration decided to prohibit purchases of the Chinese telecom giant Huawei, because 
of the current US-China trade war, Japan also re-regulated certain domestic rules regarding 
procurement procedures, in order to also exclude the Chinese firm (Wijaha and Yuma 2019). 
It is well understood that constraints on foreign policy choices do exist and the degree of 
external pressure, specifically by the US due to the significance of their bilateral relationship, 
is highly valued and calculated.  
Third, the Japanese diplomacy is heavily value oriented. Identities and values play a 
major role at its shaping. Japan considers itself a democratic peaceful nation with a mature 
market economy, being an example in the East Asia/South East Asia region (Yoshimatsu 
2012). This perception has driven Japanese diplomacy to reach other countries with similar 
value-sharing, such as Australia and India. The line of “shaping an arc of freedom and 
prosperity” as introduced by Abe‟s government in 2006, led to a series of negotiations and 
bilateral agreements, shaping in the mean time a more active diplomacy in contrast to the 
more passive approach which was adopted after the end of WWII (Yoshimatsu 2012). 
Examples of such agreements are first of all the 2007 Joint Declaration on Security 
Cooperation between Japan and Australia and the Japan-India Strategic and Global 
Partnership, which included 35 areas of cooperation specifically on the security domain (Wan 
2016).  
Fourth point of the diplomacy in Asia is its economic aspect. Economic diplomacy of 
Japan has always been the major tool of its foreign policy. Japan is pursuing its interests by 
securing economic benefits abroad, expanding its trade and investment capacity and 
providing at the same time financial and technical support to developing countries. Key 
historical moments of the country‟s economic diplomacy are the membership at the OECD in 
1967, following its G7 membership in 1975. Furthermore, through its Official Development 
Assistance programs, Japan was and still is heavily expanding its influence mainly in the South 
East Asian countries, despite the fiscal deficits the country is facing. In 1997, Japan contributed 
more than 9 billion US dollars through the aforementioned program (Beaurdy and Cook 
1999). It has also endorsed more than 20 concrete projects with the Mekong countries. 
Specifically, approximately 500 billion yen have been invested to official development 
assistance in Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam, a diplomatic measure aiming at countering 
China‟s influence in the region (Yoshimatsu 2012).  
Last but not least, the unresolved issues of the past are a burden of Japan‟s foreign 
policy. History has long been interfering with the Japanese diplomacy, shaping at a large 
extent its bilateral relations in the region. The Yasukuni Shrine visits and the issue of Comfort 
Women, which will be presented in the parts that follow, are some example of these 
„shadows‟ of the past that even after decades are still shaping the main foreign policy lines. 
These underlying issues make the bilateral relationships, especially with China and Republic of 
Korea, fragile and difficult to handle (Wan 2016). 
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To conclude, taking into account the aforementioned approaches and challenges, the 
post war diplomacy of Japan has been structured under two main pillars that remain at the 
largest extent unchanged: Focus on the economic development; aversion to the use of 
military force. Japan, until now, has focused mainly at its economic growth relying for security 
on the United States (the post war Yoshida Doctrine), utilizing it at the same time as a 
diplomatic tool, declaring its pacifism and its respect for the universal values of freedom, 
democracy, human rights and the rule of law (Kowashima 2017). Even after the end of the 
Cold War, there is a strong urge for Japan to become a „normal‟ state and even if some 
progress towards becoming a stronger political and military actor in the region has been 
made, these main basic approaches still exist. 
Lastly, another major pillar has been added, that of the „Free and Open Indo-Pacific‟. 
Japanese diplomacy is heavily engaging to this strategy in order to protect its interests, 
especially in the maritime area. It is referring mainly to the protection of trade and shipping 
lanes in a geographical area including the Asia-Pacific region to Middle East (Japanese MFA 
2019). More specifically, the strategic objectives of Japan, according to the Diplomatic Book of 
2019, include the promotion and establishment of free trade and the rule of law in the region, 
pursuing in the mean time economic prosperity and peace. These objectives are overall 
interpreted as the evolution of the Japanese diplomacy from an overall passivity to a more 
active role trying to consolidate its interests in the region of Asia and beyond.  
 
THE JAPANESE APPROACH TOWARDS CHINA 
 
Besides the general trends of Japanese diplomacy as indicated above, which dominate 
the foreign policy thinking of the post war era, China is an interesting case study indicating 
different approaches and challenges regarding Japan. The bilateral relationship could be 
safely characterized as complicated with a lot of positive aspects and disputes. An 
improvement started to appear with the normalization of their bilateral relationship which 
came in 29 September 1972. Then, the following period of 1982-1990, when China found itself 
isolated due to the Tiananmen Square incident, was cleverly exploited by the Japanese 
diplomacy in order to enhance their bilateral relationship. Sharply thinking, Japan achieved 
both pleasing its western counterparts by contributing to sanctions in China and also 
appeared as a bridge between the latter and the West (Wan 2016). Overall today, the 
Japanese diplomacy is focusing on three principles towards China as expressed by the Prime 
Minister in 2018: shifting to collaboration and not competition; being partners instead of 
threats; achieve a free and fair trade (Wijaya and Yuma 2019). The economic diplomacy of 
Japan is heavily focusing on the cooperation and expansion towards China achieving today 
an unprecedented interaction. More specifically, the two countries represent approximately 
more than 15% of global GDP, with China being established as the second strongest 
economic power, surpassing Japan, pulling more than a billion people out of under-
development (Meyer 2011).  
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According to the Japanese MFA, the two countries are characterized by “close 
economic relations”, since there are vast numbers of Chinese tourists traveling to Japan, large 
trade imports and exports and people to people exchanges. It is indeed well noted that their 
trade numbers of imports and exports were approximately 1 billion US dollars in 1972 when 
the normalization of their diplomatic relationship took place. In 2014, the same trade figures 
touch 312,4 billion US dollars (Wan 2016). This excessive economic interdependence that has 
been created the last decades is a crucial factor shaping leadership‟s decisions in the foreign 
policy of both countries.  
However, the main issues of their bilateral relationship have not been resolved. The 
Japanese social thinking, and as a result its foreign policy approach, views China as a rival 
and a threat. Consequently, their relationship remains controversial in political, historical and 
security aspects (Kuwashima 2017). The main issues that still exist today are first, the 
Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute,1 second, Taiwan, and third, the „shadows‟ of the past. Historical 
issues concerning the imperialistic past of Japan and war crimes towards its neighbors is 
intensely political challenging the Japanese diplomacy through the years. Other minor issues 
still exist such as the issue of chemical weapons which have been discarded in Chinese 
territory and the Kokaryo dispute which refers to a Tokyo student dorm that is not yet 
decided if it belongs to China or Taiwan (Wan 2016).2 
Regarding the Senkaku dispute, the country‟s policy makers were focusing on the 
usage of diplomatic bargaining and the utilization of international norms (Yoshimatsu 2012). 
In the specific case, the main diplomatic response adopted for years was laying aside the 
issue and changing the focus on other domains of cooperation. The basic foreign policy 
approach was following the „Middle Line‟ policy in the East China Sea, something that China 
does not accept and participating with China in the joint development of the Shirakaba gas 
field found in the area (Wan 2016). However, that slightly changed after the regime transition 
in 2009 when the Democratic Party (DPJ) took over the power. The general economic context 
of the financial crisis that heavily affected Japan was also a negative factor. But the key event 
that triggered the dispute and tested Japanese diplomacy was the fishing boat collision of 
2010 (McCurry 2010). The decision of the DPJ leadership to arrest the captain of a Chinese 
fishing boat, which collided with the Japanese vessel near the Senkaku islands, was signaling 
a new approach to the dispute: there is no recognized territorial dispute in the area and the 
collision is treated as a domestic affair in a Japanese territory (Wan 2016). The upcoming 
                                                          
1
 The Senkaku (in Japanese)/Diaoyu (in Chinese) dispute is referring to the country‟s territorial dispute regarding an island 
chain in the East China Sea between the two countries. Both China and Japan claim the islands and the surrounding area as 
their own territory for historical and economic reasons since research has shown that the seabed around the islands is rich in 
gas and oil reserves. 
2
 The Kokaryo dispute is referring to a student dorm which was created in the University of Kyoto in Japan for Chinese 
students in 1945. The Nationalist government of China, which fled to Taiwan after the end of the civil war, purchased the 
dorm from its Japanese owner in 1952. In the decades to come, Taiwan followed legal actions in order to evict students from 
the mainland China even if Japan has recognized Beijing as the legitimate government. The legal battle and different rulings 
continue until today with diplomatic repercussions for Japan itself, especially regarding towards its relationship with Taiwan.  
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nationalization of the islands by the following government in 2012 provoked massive 
unprecedented demonstrations in China, bringing their relationship to the lowest point since 
the normalization. 
Japan‟s diplomacy has as a result changed for the first time regarding the issue, 
getting harsher and away from its past practices. The following 2012 LDP victory in national 
elections approved that change and the overall foreign policy towards China became 
rigorous as a response to the nationalistic Japanese sentiment. The diplomatic trend from 
that point onwards was the following: strengthening the US-Japan alliance; allowing the 
Japanese military to operate outside its borders under specific circumstances; promote 
international cooperation in defense R&D; counter the rise of China by seeking and creating 
new alliances (Wan 2016). 
Regarding the historical issues, they are found again in the front row of the foreign 
policy challenges. The end of the Koizumi administration was characterized by a short period 
of calmness regarding the issue, with a foreign policy line of holding no visits to the Yasukuni 
Shrine. That changed along with the emergence of the disputes in the East China Sea and 
Prime Minister‟s Abe visit to the Shrine in 2013. The temple is considered to be, by Japan‟s 
neighbors, as the main symbol of the Japanese imperialism and military past. The prime 
ministers‟ visits throughout the years, was seen as paying homage to Class A war criminals 
enshrined there who were the main contributors to the Japanese war crimes and colonialist 
past (Kazuo 2015).3 The official diplomatic approach of Japan expressed by its Prime Minister 
Abe after his visit, is that the Shrine should not become a political issue and the purpose of 
the visit is to “pledge that Japan will never wage war again” and to “report before the souls of 
the dead” how the country‟s administration is advancing (Prime Minister of Japan Statements 
2013). 
Lastly, the third main challenge of the Japanese diplomacy is Taiwan. Japan has been 
heavily interested on the issue especially since the 90s, recognizing its high significance. The 
Taiwan Strait is the route for strategic shipping lanes to Southeast Asia and Middle East, 
being a vital key area for the Japanese national interests (Wan 2016). As a result, the relations 
between Taiwan and Beijing are of high interest for Japan. In the mean time, any alteration of 
the relationship between the two or between Taipei and Tokyo has an impact on the bilateral 
approach of China forming an interconnected political „triangle‟. The official Japanese 
position regarding the confrontation between China and Taiwan remains unchanged since 
1972. Japan, in the Joint Statement of 1972 that normalized its relations with Beijing, accepted 
the „One China Principle‟ encouraging in the mean time “a peaceful resolution of issues 
concerning Taiwan Strait through dialogue” (Wan 2016).  
                                                          
3
 The Yasukuni Shrine is a Shinto temple in Tokyo founded in 1869, honoring those who died for the country listing mainly 
names of the dead. Unfortunately, among the almost two million names there are around a thousand convicted war 
criminals. For that reason, official visits of the Prime Minister or the Emperor provoke reactions to the neighbor countries, 
accusing Japan of honoring its imperialistic past and its atrocities by paying homage to the names of the criminals.  
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The Japanese diplomacy accepts that principle, refusing however the adoption of the 
“Three No‟s” policy, as adopted by China (Wijaya and Yuma, 2019).4 
 
THE JAPANESE DIPLOMACY TOWARDS SOUTH KOREA 
 
South Korea, or else the Republic of Korea (ROK), could also be a perfect example 
showing the complexity of the Japanese foreign relations. On the one hand, ROK is forming a 
political strategic „triangle‟ with Japan and the United States creating a firm alliance in 
Northeast Asia, in order to protect their common interests against the Chinese military and 
economic rise and North Korea‟s nuclear threat. On the other hand, Japanese diplomacy is 
struggling to keep some balance in the bilateral relationship with their main ally in the region. 
A number of issues between the two make the cooperation and mutual trust extremely 
difficult and complicated. The main challenges are the issue of Comfort Women,5 the 
Yasukuni Shrine visits, history textbooks, the Takeshima/Dokdo territorial dispute6 and the 
“Sea of Japan” name dispute (Kimura 2019).7  
It is important to stress out that since the establishment of their diplomatic relations in 
1965, their relationship today has reached an all time low. The language on the Japanese 
Diplomatic Bluebook of the 2019 is rather strict on the description of their bilateral 
relationship. Taking into account that in previous diplomatic statements the ROK was 
characterized as “important neighbor” with “extreme close relations” that “share the same 
values” (MoFA 2010) or more recently as an “important neighbor” who “shares strategic 
interests” with Japan (MoFA 2016), the current rhetoric is rather different. Today the main 
statement to begin with in order to describe the relationship and diplomatic approach of 
Japan, is that their relationship “face an extremely severe situation” blaming indirectly the 
ROK‟s leadership for that evolution (MoFA 2019). Beginning with the main issues, the 
Takeshima case and the „Sea of Japan‟ name dispute, the Japanese diplomacy possess a strict 
approach. It does not recognize any dispute, firmly stating that Takeshima Islands are a part 
of Japanese territory as well as claiming that the internationally accepted name of the 
maritime region under question stands as „Sea of Japan‟. The statements from the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs also mention that “historical facts” and the “International Law” are supporting 
Japan‟s position, that the Sea of Japan is the “only international established name” and more 
                                                          
4
 The „Three No‟s‟ is a policy adopted from China towards Taiwan that characterizes its basic approach towards it: No 
independence of Taiwan, No to „two Chinas‟ or „one China and one Taiwan‟ and No to the membership of Taiwan in 
organizations with the status of a state.  
5
 As „comfort women‟ are characterized women and girls who were used as sex slaves by the Japanese army in occupied 
territories during the Second World War, mainly in the Korean Peninsula. There is different perception between South Korea 
and Japan regarding if the issue is permanently resolved.  
6
 The Takeshima (in Japanese) / Dokdo (in Korean) is an island chain that both countries claim as their own territory. It is a 
similar case as the Senkaku/Diaoyu one, as presented above.  
7
 The Sea of Japan is a maritime area between Japan, Russia and the Korean Peninsula. South and North Korea have raised 
objections towards the international name and the former country argues that the current name became common when 
Korea was under Japanese rule. 
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or less the Japanese diplomacy indirectly accuses the South Korean leadership of making 
efforts to rewrite the history between the two countries (Ryall 2019). The landing of members 
of the ROK‟s National Assembly on the Takeshima Islands, as well as the military exercises 
that took place there, have deteriorated the situation (Yamasaki 2016).  
Nevertheless, the rest of the challenges are not less significant. The different historical 
perceptions are still on the discussion table and aggravate the public opinion in both 
countries as well as augment their nationalistic sentiments. Regarding the issue of Comfort 
Women, Japan has indeed participated in discussions with the Republic of Korea achieving a 
bilateral agreement and the establishment of a taskforce to review its implementation 
(Kimura 2019). According to the Japanese diplomacy, the issue is finalized and “irreversibly 
closed” blaming the South Korean leadership of creating more claims regarding the issue and 
trying to reform the agreement (MoFA 2019). The ROK‟s initiative of building „comfort women 
statues‟ in front of the Japanese Embassy in Seoul, triggered stricter reactions where Japan 
denied any further negotiations on the issue, declaring the official closure of the bilateral 
agreement and accusing ROK for deteriorating their relationship (Kimura 2019). Regarding 
the issues of history textbooks and the Yasukuni Shrine, the problem is the same as explained 
in the previous chapter. South Korea has adopted the same position as China towards these 
issues, considering them as symbolic moves of Japan of honoring its imperialistic past and 
colonialism era. The Japanese diplomacy has refused the allegations made, as already 




The Japanese diplomacy in Asia is apparently multifaceted. As it happens with all 
sovereign states, some foreign policy lines remain strictly untouchable when others are more 
adaptable to change. The Japanese diplomacy in Asia is a mixture of these two elements. 
Issues concerning Senkaku and Takeshima are not discussable but in other domains, such as 
the issue of the Comfort Women, changes have been made trying to find a common ground. 
As indicated throughout the paper, the main policy lines Japanese diplomacy use, are at a 
large extent attached and dependent to the US foreign policy choices as well as other past 
practices. Being more specific, regarding the Sino-Japanese relationship, the first case study 
of the paper, the Japanese diplomacy faces difficulties in order to find alternative approaches. 
The Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute seems to be impossible to be resolved in the near future. China 
has already surpassed Japan in nominal GDP terms and its military rise has established the 
country as a regional and international great power that will not accept a compromise. Japan, 
will also not. The „Middle Line‟ policy option, which Japan provided China regarding East 
China Sea, splitting the maritime region in half, has not been accepted by China. Two facts 
must always be kept in mind as well. First, nationalistic sentiments are not going to be 
diminished in either of the two countries; second, historical burdens will still exist since neither 
of the two countries seems to be eager to participate in sensitive historical discussions.  
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Also taking into consideration how public opinions shape foreign policies at a 
significant extent, it is more likely that the current status quo will remain as such. 
The second case study is a different story. Republic of Korea is the main ally of Japan 
in the region. Their two common threats of North Korea and China are more than real and 
require immediate attention and close cooperation between the two countries plus the 
United States. Nevertheless, the burden of the past seems to be at the moment an extremely 
sensitive issue. The Japanese diplomacy has adopted an approach of denying new 
discussions on issues like Comfort Women and other historical incidents, considering them 
officially resolved. The Takeshima territorial dispute could also escalate rapidly. Japan is not 
recognizing a dispute at the area while South Korea, driven mainly by the public emotion of 
the mass, is acting as the islands are its own territory confronting Japan directly. 
Finally, the Japanese diplomacy in Asia is also focusing on promoting its values and its 
influence mainly by economic means. Japan always saw itself as the responsible power to 
lead the region and as a bridge between West and Asia, being the example of economic 
development and prosperity. The XXI century has changed this reality. Historical challenges 
must be resolved and the Japanese diplomacy must show adaptability and flexibility given the 
fact that it is per se constrained due to the incapability of Japan of being a strong military 
power. Given the current situation and how the regional affairs are evolving, the status quo 
will, at a large extent, remain unchanged as well as the main trends of the Japanese 
diplomacy. The future though is unpredictable and more potential aggressiveness in the 
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